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Introduction 
 
 
The New White Paper 2016 – Promoting 
Greater Understanding of Security Policy? 
Markus Kaim and Hilmar Linnenkamp 
Security policy White Papers perform several functions. They serve to inform the Ger-
man Bundestag and the German public, outline the Federal Government’s security 
policy priorities with other countries, especially Germany’s most important partners, 
and assist communication within the Bundeswehr. The White Paper 2016 is the first of 
its kind since 2006 and upholds this tradition. Its authors seek to redefine Germany’s 
current and future security policy based on events and developments such as the global 
financial crisis, financial turmoil in the euro area, the suspension of conscription in 
Germany, upheavals in the Middle East and Russia’s annexation of the Crimea. The Fed-
eral Government aims to inform the public and its allies in NATO and the EU precisely 
what the intentions of its security policy are. However, the contours of the Bundeswehr 
itself and its future remain blurred. The White Paper process, as it is known, was founded 
on the expectation of being able to openly and publicly discuss all aspects of defence 
policy. In continuing this process, it is now important to highlight security policy suc-
cesses, to recognise deficits, to specify action plans and to propose any follow-up work 
that may be required. 
 
The Federal Government presented its ‘White 
Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and 
the Future of the Bundeswehr’ in July 2016. 
The first part gives an account of Germany’s 
current security policy and its strategic pri-
orities. The second part outlines the planned 
future of the Bundeswehr. So far, so conven-
tional. Unsurprisingly, this White Paper also 
notes that the principles it sets out are to 
be given more substance in “follow-on docu-
ments”. What this follow-up work might en-
tail is outlined in seven subject areas which, 
on closer inspection, stand out either be-
cause they set a new course or because 
they merely hint at weighty issues without 
determining their political consequences. 
The White Paper 2016 does not have the 
final say on any of these topics. It therefore 
represents the beginning and not the end 
of the debate on security policy. 
Level of ambition in 
shaping security policy 
The White Paper 2016 contains almost the 
same arguments used by the Federal Presi-
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dent in his speech at the Munich Security 
Conference in 2014: that Germany and 
Europe are facing a series of tectonic shifts 
in international politics which have given 
rise to an unusual abundance of conflicts 
and questioned many certainties in dealing 
with them. Berlin did not seek its current 
leadership role within the EU and (to a lesser 
extent) NATO, as this situation occurred 
due to the weakness of other, traditional 
leading powers. This indicates a change of 
self-image for the Federal Republic into a 
power with an increased level of ambition 
and, as a consequence, Berlin now defines 
itself more as a partner in ensuring and 
shaping international order. The statement, 
“Germany’s security policy horizon is glo-
bal” (p. 56) appears rather ambitious, how-
ever. It is undisputed that Germany is 
affected more than ever by developments 
around the globe. Nevertheless, Germany’s 
security policy is likely to focus on the 
neighbourhood of the European Union, as 
suggested for the EU in its Global Strategy 
presented in June 2016. The White Paper 
rightly points out the limits of German 
security policy, “Our means and instru-
ments of security policy are extensive and 
diverse. They are, however, limited. Stra-
tegic decisions have to be taken in order 
to determine whether, when and to what 
extent Germany will commit itself” (p. 57). 
One task for the short term will be to 
substantiate this level of ambition for more 
influence in shaping the global order. While 
Germany’s leadership role in the EU has 
become more fragile, it is just beginning 
to take shape in NATO. Germany is visibly 
contributing to measures adopted at the 
Warsaw Summit in July 2016 to reassure 
the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. However, Germany is not even 
close to meeting its commitments to the 
United Nations (UN), especially its peace-
keeping missions. Although the Federal 
Government repeatedly points out that 
Germany is one of the largest contributors 
to the UN, it also correctly states that the 
transition from ‘classic’ peacekeeping to 
complex multidimensional missions with 
the UN’s sometimes robust mandates poses 
significant challenges. The White Paper also 
gives the UN priority over both NATO and 
the EU as Germany’s international sphere 
of influence. But Berlin has only sent 432 
men and women to take part in global 
peacekeeping missions (as of 31st August 
2016). In view of Germany’s application for 
a non-permanent seat on the Security Coun-
cil in 2019/20, this could be described as 
half-hearted at best. Despite all the difficul-
ties, the UN’s peacekeeping and peace mak-
ing missions have been comparatively suc-
cessful instruments. As a result, Germany’s 
European partners such as Italy and the 
Netherlands are about to ‘rediscover’ peace-
keeping missions, that is, become more in-
volved in this area in terms of personnel 
and material. Given this situation, Germa-
ny’s reticence is all the more regrettable. 
Reshaping transatlantic security 
relationships 
As for transatlantic security relationships, 
they have taken on a new tone. While in 
earlier documents, the unequal burden-
sharing between the US and its European 
allies was either ignored or glossed over, 
the authors of this White Paper have ad-
dressed the US’s dissatisfaction with the 
Europeans and acknowledge that more 
must be done, “The transatlantic security 
partnership will grow closer and become 
more productive the more we Europeans 
are prepared to shoulder a larger share of 
the common burden” (p. 31). This applies 
ostensibly to the financial aspect, that is, 
the self-professed commitment of all NATO 
members to increase their defence spend-
ing to 2 percent of GDP in the long term. 
Although medium-term financial plan-
ning sees an increase in Germany’s defence 
budget to 39 billion euros by 2020, this is 
a long way off the 2 percent target it set 
it self. And this is likely to remain the case 
in the long term. The wording in the White 
Paper that, “The financial resources […] 
are provided in accordance with the budg-
etary decisions of the German Government” 
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(p. 117) is therefore more likely to signal 
a permanent restriction rather than a sig-
nificant increase in the defence budget. 
Given the selective withdrawal of the US 
from world politics, the political prospects 
of burden-sharing will extend much further 
and beyond NATO. Europe needs to con-
sider itself more of a force for international 
order, at least in the European neighbour-
hood, and therefore become more politically 
committed to crisis management. This is 
already evident to some extent, especially 
in its containment of the Ukraine crisis. 
Its efforts in other challenges, however, 
remain piecemeal or Europe only plays a 
secondary role, for instance, in establishing 
peace in civil war-torn Syria. The special 
role of German foreign policy in such crises 
is less related to national power or assert-
ing German interests. Rather, it resulted 
from the commitment of the Federal Gov-
ernment to achieving a sometimes difficult 
consensus within the EU and with the US. 
The majority of German responsibility 
therefore continues to be expressed in its 
leadership with other countries and for 
other countries. 
This is accompanied by the need to 
strengthen the European pillar of the 
alliance. Without referring to it explicitly, 
this seems to be a throwback to the 1990s 
debate as to whether stronger European 
defence ambitions should be pursued in-
side or outside NATO. While in recent years 
its focus has been more on the EU, the 
White Paper now acknowledges the rising 
political importance of the NATO alliance 
and European efforts in security and de-
fence policy are once again more strongly 
embedded in the North Atlantic Alliance. 
This was both a reaction to the preferences 
of many allies and also to the as yet modest 
political progress made on the European 
Union’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP). 
Militarily, the outline for a more promi-
nent European role in the alliance is already 
in place alongside existing bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation projects. But even 
more is needed. Firstly, one should reflect 
back on those goals that were once decisive 
for the development of the European Se-
curity and Defence Identity (ESDI) within 
NATO. These include, for example, im-
proved availability of alliance resources and 
capabilities with which EU-led operations 
can be supported. Secondly, close consulta-
tion between NATO and the EU would be 
advisable in planning and implementing 
those EU operations that utilise the re-
sources and capabilities of NATO. Thirdly, 
the alliance’s command structure must be 
capable of providing headquarter elements 
for directing EU operations. All this would 
severely curtail the autonomy of the EU’s 
security policy, but it would be inevitable. 
Politically, the way forward is still un-
clear, even though individual elements of 
what were once conceptualised as the ESDI 
have begun to tacitly influence German and 
European security policy in recent years. 
One example of this is the European obliga-
tion to more effectively contribute to co-
operation between NATO and the EU, for 
example, by the respective institution par-
ticipating in North Atlantic Council and 
EU Council meetings. Further steps towards 
‘rediscovering’ the European Security and 
Defence Identity might include defining a 
geographic or functional division of labour 
between the US and the Europeans in the 
alliance and to find an institutional form 
for policy coordination within the Euro-
pean pillar of NATO. A kind of ‘European 
caucus’, that is, a European coordinating 
body within NATO at Defence Minister level 
would be an expression of European Mem-
ber States’ greater responsibility for secu-
rity policy. 
EU security policy 
Against this background, it seems question-
able how appropriate it is for this White 
Paper to talk of greater security policy inte-
gration for which the EU has not mustered 
the energy even in better times. According 
to the White Paper, the way to a ‘European 
Security and Defence Union’, the ultimate 
aim of German policy, is to further develop 
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CSDP structures, to integrate civilian and 
military capabilities and strengthen the 
European defence industry. But this route 
could have been taken a long time ago. No 
one has prevented the EU from deploying 
its Battlegroups (EU BG) in any crisis in 
recent years. EU Member States would have 
been able to operate a ‘permanent struc-
tured cooperation’, the core of Franco-Ger-
man proposals from 12th September 2016 
to further develop CSDP. 
In short, CSDP has failed to fulfil its 
potential due to a lack of political will. 
Using the concept and the term “union” in 
the context of European integration implies 
that this can only mean a long-term com-
munitisation of the policy field, as has been 
the case with monetary union. This could 
mean, for example, creating the post of a 
fully-fledged EU Commissioner with author-
ity over EU troops and transferring parlia-
mentary approval from national parlia-
ments to the European Parliament. This 
significant leap towards integration may 
well be an objective of German security 
policy. But those in favour of this objective 
should be absolutely clear about it and 
outline the steps to get there with a bind-
ing timetable, as was the case with mone-
tary union. Given the current widespread 
aversion to greater integration, the argu-
ment in the White Paper for a Security and 
Defence Union initially appears ambitious, 
but it suffers from the impression of indeci-
sion and half-heartedness. The Brexit vote 
by the British electorate on 23rd June 2016 
has only intensified and accelerated an 
ongoing development. While security and 
defence are a major focus of the Bratislava 
Process – the EU process of reflection after 
the Brexit vote – the challenge for Member 
States now will be to link this policy field 
with implementing the European Global 
Strategy and connecting it to strategic con-
siderations on the scope of EU foreign and 
security policy. 
Status of the Euro-Atlantic 
security order 
The White Paper chapter on the Euro-Atlan-
tic security order and the Russian policy of 
confrontation towards it are remarkably 
clear. It is said that by annexing the Crimea 
and destabilising eastern Ukraine, Russia 
has openly called into question the Euro-
pean order of peace and stability. If it con-
tinues on this course, “Russia will consti-
tute a challenge to the security of our conti-
nent in the foreseeable future” (p. 32). The 
German Federal Republic has committed 
itself within the EU to the regime of sanc-
tions against Russia aimed at upholding 
the Euro-Atlantic security order whose prin-
ciples are enshrined in the Paris Charter. 
Despite differences in the rhetoric from 
Member States, the Federal Government 
has succeeded in convincing them all to 
continue their commitment to the sanc-
tions. Germany’s reaction in the NATO con-
text was much stronger and more deter-
mined than many observers had expected. 
For one thing, the Federal Republic made a 
considerable contribution to steps agreed at 
the Warsaw Summit to militarily reassure 
the countries of central and Eastern Europe. 
In addition, it simultaneously offered Mos-
cow a dialogue as part of efforts to main-
tain the status quo of the Euro-Atlantic 
security order and to prevent its further 
erosion. German policy is based on the 
assumption that also underlies the White 
Paper: Germany’s influence in internatio-
nal politics has never been based on the 
threat or use of military force for various 
reasons. Rather, the Federal Republic’s 
influence in international politics is still 
based on a cooperative modus operandi 
which is expressed as a rules-based inter-
national order. This order is therefore an 
essential prerequisite for Germany’s am-
bition to shape the future of global politics 
in and with Europe. 
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Flexibilisation and 
ad hoc cooperation 
The explicit reference in the White Paper to 
Germany’s participation in ad hoc coopera-
tion is new. It means forming groups to 
tackle or at least contain specific security 
problems outside fixed institutional for-
mats. While political cooperation of this 
kind is certainly not new – there are many 
examples of it, including the E3+3 format 
for negotiating the conflict over Iran’s 
nuclear programme and the Normandy 
format for managing the Ukraine crisis – 
informal military cooperation is virgin 
territory for German security policy and 
politically more problematic. One example 
is the international coalition against the 
Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, in which 
Germany is also participating. 
There are four important aspects to 
consider here. Firstly, political control is 
informal and opaque. There is a difference 
between ad hoc coalitions and cases in 
which multilateral organisations have been 
entrusted with the command of such opera-
tions, such as the North Atlantic Council 
(for NATO) or the Political and Security 
Committee (for the EU). It is unclear, how-
ever, precisely how and who controls the 
“Combined Joint Task Force – Operation 
Inherent Resolve”, the military framework 
for the German operation in the Middle 
East. Secondly, a multilateral cooperation 
forces participants to formulate conceptual 
ideas as to what should be achieved politi-
cally by military missions abroad. By con-
trast, the trend towards informal coalitions 
encourages the depoliticisation of such 
missions. Thirdly, there are no agreed pro-
cedures for sharing the financial burden 
and providing military capabilities. Fourth-
ly, the tendency to enter into ad hoc co-
operation also has constitutional implica-
tions. To date, Bundeswehr missions abroad 
have been conducted in line with Federal 
Constitutional Court jurisdiction, in particu-
lar as part of a system of collective security 
in accordance with article 24, paragraph 2 
of Germany’s Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Ad hoc 
coalitions are incompatible with this legis-
lation because they are based neither on 
permanency nor reciprocity. The reference 
to article 42, paragraph 7 of the Treaty on 
the European Union (TEU) does not help 
either because the Syria/Iraq deployment is 
not led by the EU. It is apparent that – for 
the medium and long-term – Bundeswehr 
missions abroad require another form of 
legitimacy if this practice of informalisa-
tion is to become firmly established. Just 
recently, a debate began over whether ar-
ticle 87 of Germany’s Basic Law can provide 
the legal basis for mandates. The precise 
meaning of the term ‘defence’ needs to be 
clarified here as this will be extremely im-
portant for future missions abroad. 
Enabling – a new objective 
There will be no German majority in favour 
of major overseas missions for the foresee-
able future because, given their dubious 
success in Afghanistan, they are seen as ex-
pensive, ineffective and therefore dispen-
sable. This changes the function of these 
operations, as outlined again in the White 
Paper. The aim of previous missions was to 
fundamentally restructure the state order 
based on ‘nation-building’ or promoting 
democracy after a conflict had ended. How-
ever, the aim of future missions is to enable 
individual governments or regional organi-
sations according to the principle of sub-
sidiarity, to meet security policy challenges 
on their own and to ensure peace and inter-
national security in accordance with the 
UN Charter. Even if one function does not 
completely replace the other, it is obvious 
particularly in the case of EU missions that 
the focus is shifting from ‘security provider’ 
to ‘security consultant’. 
If this policy is to be successful it must 
meet two conditions. Firstly, those forces 
that are supported must be democratically 
controlled and embedded in a system of 
functioning political institutions. Other-
wise, the competencies offered by the Bun-
deswehr might possibly achieve the oppo-
site of what was intended. If training and 
equipment were later abused for violent 
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takeovers or internal political repression, 
this would lead to instability and would 
thus undermine the normative basis of 
German foreign policy. 
Secondly, the permanent military en-
hancement of a government or regional 
organisation must be anchored in a com-
prehensive national and regional strategy. 
Additional foreign policy tools are required, 
including support to establish political 
institutions and targeted European develop-
ment cooperation. For example, the Euro-
pean Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) 
has been training several thousand soldiers 
in the Malian army with German partici-
pation since February 2013. However, their 
effectiveness has hardly improved at all. 
Islamist rebels in the north of the country 
have been on the rise again in recent 
months and the security situation has 
deteriorated considerably. 
Internal development of the Bundes-
wehr: modernisation and its down-
side 
One of the most common and key functions 
of White Papers has always been to paint a 
vivid picture of the Bundeswehr and espe-
cially the future of the armed forces. This 
aids self-understanding and satisfies legiti-
mate public interest in them as an instru-
ment of foreign and security policy. Arma-
ments play a pivotal as well as controversial 
role in this. The Bundeswehr should not 
be suspected of selectively removing them 
from public scrutiny. Instead, they should 
be seen in the context of general techno-
logical advancements and modernisation 
in major organisations. 
The rapid development of information 
technology has increasingly shaped the 
global arms industry. Software updates 
have become the key instruments of mod-
ernising complex systems. However, there 
is very little mention of this distinctive 
technological trend in the White Paper. In 
any case, the document does not contain 
any information about the current or 
future state of arms in the German Army, 
Air Force or Navy. In terms of practically 
shaping the Bundeswehr’s military capabil-
ities, two topics deserve particular atten-
tion: autonomous systems (in particular, 
‘lethal autonomous weapon systems’, 
LAWS) and the organisation of cyber capa-
bilities under the responsibility of the Fed-
eral Ministry of Defence. 
In the past three years, there have been 
two public debates about autonomous or 
semi-autonomous airborne systems. The 
first was related to the reconnaissance sys-
tem, Eurohawk, which is supposed to be 
able to operate in European airspace with-
out endangering civil aviation, and the 
other was about the potential acquisition 
of armed drones. Neither debate came to 
a conclusion. Even though or perhaps 
because neither of these two topics appear 
in the White Paper, the Federal Govern-
ment will not only have to explain its arms 
and cooperation policies but also its arms 
control policy on combat drones. 
The growing importance of cyberspace 
requires conceptual but also organisational 
clarification. Here, the focus is on the com-
plex issue of how to strike a balance be-
tween offensive and defensive capabilities. 
In 2015, the Minister of Defence publicly 
announced a restructuring of the Ministry 
and its subordinate authorities in such a 
way as to remove the fragmentation of com-
petencies and capacities in this field. There 
are no details about these plans in the 
White Paper. 
It is the ongoing task of arms moderni-
sation to provide command and control, 
weapons and support systems – on time, 
of high technological quality and at reason-
able cost. All major projects and program-
mes were thoroughly checked. The result is 
an ‘Armaments Agenda’ whose key terms 
are Europeanisation, transparency and 
innovation. It would be helpful to describe 
changes in arms management based on key 
projects and to confront the stated aims of 
the White Paper with defence industrial 
and cooperation policy requirements. This 
is the only way to find out what a “value-
based leadership culture” and “a culture of 
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trust, responsibility and error manage-
ment” (p. 128) in arms management really 
mean. 
The Ministry of Defence’s modernisation 
programme also includes a reform of per-
sonnel policy. Since the end of conscrip-
tion, the Bundeswehr has no longer been 
able to recruit from an endless pool of long-
serving and professional soldiers. Today, 
the Army has to advertise in the labour 
market and offer attractive career opportu-
nities. Some changes are being introduced, 
such as regulations on working hours, 
family-friendliness and improvements in 
infrastructure. But it is still a difficult task 
to recruit and keep enough qualified per-
sonnel. Almost incidentally, the White 
Paper also contains a revolutionary, albeit 
hypothetical proposal: to open up the Bun-
deswehr to citizens of the European Union. 
After thorough legal examination, it may 
prove worthwhile to discuss the idea with 
our partners in a multilateral dialogue. 
Conclusion 
The first part of the White Paper, which 
deals with security policy, justifies and 
affirms increased expectations on Germa-
ny’s contribution to international crisis 
prevention and conflict management. This 
updates a policy which, beyond peace 
rhetoric, reflects the fact that contingents 
of the Bundeswehr have been engaged in 
international crises and conflicts for over 
twenty years. What experience has Ger-
many had in this regard? What lessons has 
it learned and to which has it paid heed? 
What successes can the Federal Govern-
ment and the Bundestag build on for future 
missions? These questions should be dis-
cussed openly and transparently in public, 
not least because they are only hinted at in 
the White Paper. Missions, arms exports 
and training assistance – all these instru-
ments deserve to be accounted for in detail. 
This should be part of the follow-up work 
of an ambitious White Paper. 
Specifically, the Federal Government 
should participate in all three of the areas 
of security policy addressed in the White 
Paper for Germany: 
 It should outline the next steps in NATO’s 
reassurance and deterrence strategy and 
Germany’s contribution to it. In this con-
text, it will have to clarify, more so than 
it has done in the White Paper, the im-
portance it attaches to nuclear deter-
rence in the future. As well as protecting 
its own territorial integrity, it should 
also make greater efforts to protect the 
political sovereignty of its allies. 
 It should more clearly define its level of 
ambition for the Common Security and 
Defence Policy of the EU in the Bratislava 
Process. Whilst the Franco-German paper 
on the renewal of CSDP from 12th Sep-
tember 2016 does outline steps towards 
greater cooperation, it remains unclear 
as to how willing the Federal Govern-
ment really is to push for security and 
defence policy integration. 
 It should reinforce its noticeable appre-
ciation of the United Nations as an 
action field for Germany’s security policy 
by providing substantial and sustainable 
contributions to peacekeeping opera-
tions. At the same time, it should make 
greater use of these contributions to 
realise its regional and global policy 
objectives. For that, it would be helpful 
to take up key positions in UN missions, 
such as Special Envoy of the UN Secre-
tary-General or Force Commander. 
In terms of the development of the Bun-
deswehr, the Federal Government should 
clarify the link between political priorities 
and military capability planning. This link 
was rather vaguely described in the White 
Paper. It therefore makes sense to debate 
general statements of intent – on balanced 
armed forces, more intensive cooperation 
with NATO and the EU, modernised re-
search, development and procurement 
processes – with the aid of specific projects. 
Greater transparency would promote sup-
port of Germany’s armed forces among 
its citizens. Many want to know what the 
German Navy can achieve today and in ten 
years and what the capabilities of the Air 
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Force and the Army could be deployed for 
with any prospect of success. The question 
of how the Federal Government intends 
to achieve the dual objectives of adequate 
breadth and necessary depth of its military 
capabilities is also of interest. 
Although the White Paper is an executive 
document and, given their powers to finance 
and legitimise defence and security policy 
action, members of the Bundestag and the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed 
Forces should have a greater say in the posi-
tioning of security policy. An annual debate 
on Germany’s security and defence policy 
might stabilise the discussion process this 
White Paper is intended to stimulate. 
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